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The contingency/inevitability (C/I) problem consists in questions about the extent to which 
science contingent or inevitable, what parts of it are contingent or inevitable, and whether 
alternative scientific trajectories might be just as successful as the one we have. It is relatively new 
as a well-delineated object of philosophical inquiry, dating to Ian Hacking’s observation in The 
Social Construction of What? (1999) that the social construction movement raises questions about 
contingency and inevitability that can be understood as distinct from, and perhaps more 
promising than, longstanding debates about scientific realism and anti-realism. In the years since 
Hacking defined the key terms of the C/I problem, a group of scholars has coalesced around the 
questions he posed. Those questions motivated, for example, a 2009 workshop at the Fondation 
Des Treilles in Tourtour, France, and this book synthesizes its results. 
A volume seeking to define an issue of such recent vintage faces numerous challenges, not 
least of which is justifying its subject’s philosophical worth. This task falls within the remit of Léna 
Soler’s introduction. Soler locates the C/I problem subsequent to what she calls the “turn to 
practice” (2). This methodological tradition within science studies, beginning in the 1970s and 
picking up steam through the later twentieth century, rejected a narrow focus on the logical 
structure of theories and instead maintained that understanding the scientific enterprise requires 
engaging with the details of community structures, experimental techniques, pedagogical 
traditions, and other contextually situated practices. Works in this tradition often focus on local 
case studies, but they share the conviction that our “inevitabilist instinct” (21)—the common and 
persistent sense that the trajectory of science is in some way inured to the contingencies of its 
context—is mistaken. The C/I problem, Soler contends, offers a systematic way to interrogate this 
instinct and in so doing to develop philosophical accounts of the scientific project that bring some 
of our deepest and least-examined assumptions about it to the fore. 
The fifteen contributions Soler introduces aim to illustrate how this is so. They are sorted 
into six sections, each of which confronts a different aspect of the C/I problem. Part 1 tackles 
some general issues with delineating the problem. Soler also contributes the first essay, which 
attacks an argument that threatens to clip the C/I problem’s wings before it takes flight: the “put-
up-or-shut-demand,” the charge than unless those claiming that the results of successful science are 
contingent can produce actually existing alternatives, then the argument for contingency is moot. 
Rather than undermining contingentism, however, this charge, on Soler’s account, exposes the 
deep commitment to monism that pervades modern science. Through the socialization of its 
practitioners, the functioning of its institutions, and the policing of its ranks, science actively shuts 
down any alternatives to the prevailing consensus. The burden of proof falls on the inevitabilist to 
defend monism, Soler argues, before any empirical demands can be leveled at the contingentist. 
The other contribution in part 1, by Catherine Allamel-Raffin and Jean-Luc Gangloff, 
seeks to define contingentism and inevitabilism. They note that considerable ambiguity remains in 
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several aspects of the issue. It is not clear if contingency and inevitability are all-or-nothing 
propositions, or if intermediate, compatibilist positions are viable. The problem has been 
elaborated principally through examples from physics at the expense of biology, chemistry, 
psychology, and other sciences, and this might skew the conversation in ways that are not clear 
until studies of additional sciences are available. When we talk of inevitability, we might mean 
logical inevitability or we might mean practical (historical, sociological) inevitability. In order to 
ground claims that an alternative science could equal the success of the science we have, we will 
need rigorous criteria for success. Despite these ambiguities, Allamel-Raffin and Gangloff conclude 
that “the notions of contingentism/inevitabilism seem to be the most promising heuristic device of 
the past decade for a better understanding of what science actually is” (113). They follow Soler in 
suggesting that these are exactly the types of questions we need to be asking, and which have not 
been adequately addressed in the context of other philosophical problems. 
Part 2 turns to perhaps the most troubling question about the C/I problem: how is it 
different from the realism/anti-realism debate? The three essays here give somewhat different 
pictures. Andrew Pickering’s essay reprises his argument from The Mangle of Practice (1995), 
pointing to the deep ontological commitments we accept if we succumb to the inevitabilist instinct 
and suggesting that it closes our eyes to the various types of agency at play in creating scientific 
knowledge. On this account, contingentism appears as a tool deployed in the service of a 
conversation still defined by realism/anti-realism. Emiliano Trizio aims to put some distance 
between the two issues. It is possible, he suggests, to be both an anti-realist and an inevitabilist—we 
might argue that the internal logic of science compels certain theoretical shifts, without presuming 
that those shifts result in truer knowledge of the world. Trizio, however, denies that a contingentist 
can also be a realist, given his understanding of (meaningful) contingency as making deep claims 
about the metaphysical underpinnings of science. Mieke Boon, in contrast to both Pickering and 
Trizio, attempts to conceptualize the C/I problem in a way that moves past the realism/anti-
realism debate. She observes that contingency and inevitability can coexist, and might intermingle 
in different ways, depending on what aspects of science they hold to be contingent or inevitable. 
It is evident from part 2 that the realism/anti-realism axis still wields considerable 
influence over how philosophers think about contingency and inevitability. It also, however, 
suggests how the two problems can be disentangled. Pickering and Trizio both identify the 
contingency of ontological claims as the most meaningful and interesting form of contingency. But 
Boon shows, as have others (Kinzel 2015; Martin 2013), that contingency claims can also be 
meaningful when applied to other targets. If we think of contingency claims as applicable not just 
to scientists’ claims about the entities, processes, and/or structures that exist in the world, but also 
to their instruments, interpretations, practices, and values, then we see more clearly how the C/I 
problem is distinct from the realism/anti-realism debate. When applied to different targets, 
contingency and inevitability can comfortably coexist in a way that realism and anti-realism cannot. 
The remainder of the volume cleaves mostly to an expansive view of contingency and 
inevitability in line with Boon’s interpretation. Part 3 includes three essays on ways to empirically 
frame contingency claims. With the exception of Harry Collins, whose contribution seeks to make 
the contingency question tractable by looking at the way alternatives present themselves in the 
short term, these authors turn to history. Ronald N. Giere advocates for an evolutionary 
understanding of scientific development. In abstract terms, it is difficult or impossible to say 
whether the large sweep of evolution is contingent or inevitable, but we can provide fairly robust 
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local accounts based on our historical knowledge of the relevant constraints at specific times and 
places. Yves Gingras turns to the case study of electron diffraction to show that a variety of 
contingent factors—order of discovery, accident, individual predilections, and other idiosyncrasies 
of human history—work together to produce historical sequences that might be more or less 
robust, depending on how these factors work together. 
The question of we can empirically arbitrate contingency claims highlights a particularly 
notable feature of the C/I problem: the deep connection it implies between history and 
philosophy of science. Historians are sometimes apt to malign philosophy as a field prone to 
shoehorning complicated historical narratives into preconceived and overly abstract frameworks. 
Philosophers, for their part, sometimes consider historians so mired in local detail that they close 
their eyes to even the possibility of generalizable conclusions. These are caricatures, but they reflect 
features recent history of these disciplines that shape their interactions and point out the real—and 
regrettable—distance between them. The C/I problem offers the possibility of transcending this 
divide. Arbitrating contingency claims requires engaging with a type of history that historians will 
recognize, and philosophical examinations of the role of contingency in science have widespread 
implications for historical methodology, for example by raising questions about the way 
counterfactual claims can, should, or should not be used in historical reasoning. 
The book’s fourth part confronts the inevitability thesis where it is ostensibly strongest: 
mathematics. Jean Paul van Bendegem contends that mathematics does indeed have contingent 
elements by developing alternative accounts of a) complex numbers, and b) the possibility proof-
free arithmetic. Jean-Michael Salanskis describes why people think mathematics is inevitable, 
before turning to his case that we nonetheless have flexibility within the “frameworks” we use to 
interpret mathematical axioms. Finally, Ian Hacking takes a step back to consider the contingent 
elements of what we count as mathematics. Although it appears as the epitome of the a priori, 
mathematics is a discipline, and the boundary conditions of that discipline, and to some extent its 
internal divisions and hierarchies—e.g. between pure and applied science—are based on contingent 
factors, such as the political conditions in ancient Athens and the growing role of computation in 
modern mathematics. 
Whereas taking contingency into the realm of mathematics might be considered a 
sharpening of the focus on physics that has framed the C/I problem, part 5 addresses Allamel-
Raffin and Gangloff’s call to expand the discussion into other sciences. Michel Bitbol and Claire 
Petitmengin discuss the contingent nature of the methods used to develop psychological 
understanding through the twentieth century. Joseph Rouse, suggesting that “taking physics as a 
stand-in for science in general may … prove misguided” (324), deploys a range of examples, 
including some from biology, to argue that a focus on scientific practice is essential for 
understanding and arbitrating contingency claims. This section further reinforces the idea that 
The C/I problem is widely relevant beyond the ontology of science and provides a useful rubric for 
understanding how science is practiced. 
The sixth and final section concerns itself with pluralism. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond and 
Hasok Chang both challenge the monist tendency of modern science. For Lévy-Leblond, the ways 
in which physical theories, in particular space-time theories, have been articulated mathematically 
exhibit a great deal of polymorphism, which suggests that the manner of their development is 
contingent. Chang presents the case for pluralism, understood as the active cultivation of many 
alternative scientific traditions (Chang 2012), in the vocabulary of the C/I problem. A pluralist 
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approach, he suggests, would offer a way to arbitrate contingency claims by providing a rich 
foundation of actual alternatives to evaluate. The connection between contingency and pluralism, 
like the connection between contingency and realism, is less about elucidating the C/I problem 
than it is about showing how it connects with other conversations in philosophy of science. 
Discussions of these connections nevertheless advance this book’s aim to state emphatically the 
C/I problem’s importance. 
The ease with which many of this book’s authors connect the C/I problem to established 
areas of philosophical interest bodes well for the C/I problem as a continued and lively area of 
research. And, indeed, this volume presents a number of questions that demand further 
investigation. How, for instance, should we approach counterfactual reasoning when elaborating 
cases from the history of science? Counterfactual history has received renewed attention from 
historians of science recently (Bowler 2013, Raddick 2008), but a careful synthesis of the 
philosophical tools developed in the context of the C/I problem and insights from historical 
methodology awaits. As many contributors to this volume note, the notion of ‘success’ remains to 
be elaborated, especially if it is to be used in a way that is agnostic about truth. And this volume 
both acknowledges and illustrates the disproportionate emphasis on physics that has shaped 
discussions of contingency. Detailed work on other sciences is much needed. 
Examining this volume as a whole reveals two key advantages of the C/I problem that 
anyone taking up these questions would enjoy. First, thinking in terms of types and degrees of 
contingency offers the possibility of closer, more productive linkages between history and 
philosophy of science. Second, it provides a philosophical approach sensitive to all the details and 
idiosyncrasies of scientific practice, much like social constructionism, but avoiding deep 
assumptions at the outset about the epistemological status of scientific knowledge. It is also clear 
that discussions of contingency and inevitability are at their most interesting and useful when 
understood as distinct from the realism/anti-realism debate. The latter has never quite escaped the 
Manicheism of the science wars. Like the internalist/externalist divide in history of science, it 
appears too pat in light of the more sophisticated understanding of scientific practice that has 
emerged in the past few decades. The C/I problem’s flexibility, which makes it more sensitive to 
history and practice, also make it a better suited to a more methodologically ecumenical (if not 
pluralist) context. 
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